



In corporate crime investigations, when prosecutors pursue
charges against both employees and corporations, confessions raise
several novel questions without clear answers in constitutional criminal
procedure. First, corporations confess. The firm, a target of a criminal
investigation, may itself admit to crimes by employees as part of a
settlement agreement with prosecutors. While useful to study in their
impact and form, as a constitutional matter such confessions can not be
coerced, the Supreme Court has adopted a "collective entity rule" that
corporate persons may not invoke Fifth Amendment privilege. Second,
before itself confessing, the firm may encourage employees to provide
statements to law enforcement, placing some in the precarious position
of deciding whether to speak and inculpate themselves or invoke Fifth
Amendment privilege and be disciplined or fired. The question then
arises whether the Fifth Amendment protects such employees. This
Article develops how the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in its line of "penalty cases, " offers scant protection
absent substantial formal cooperation between prosecutors and the
employer. Instead, cooperation with internal investigators and law
enforcement will be structured by employment contracts and a firm's
interest in avoiding conflicts of interest and formation of unintended
attorney-client relationships between employees and corporate counsel.
Thus, not only may the corporation confess, but the environment in
which employee confessions occur is largely defined by interests of the
corporation.
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Confessions during corporate crime investigations, unlike
confessions made while under police custody, implicate relationships
between corporations and employees far more than constitutional
criminal procedure. In cases involving custodial interrogations, the
Supreme Court adopted Fifth Amendment protections, including the
Miranda warnings, intended to remedy the coercion inherent when
police question an unrepresented suspect in an isolated room, and the
voluntariness standard, that assesses police pressure ranging from
psychological tactics, threats of violence, and torture. In corporate
crime investigations, however, confessions arise in a far more genteel
environment. Employees are interviewed at their workplace, by
corporate counsel, or also by independent auditors, regulators or law
enforcement.
Prior to any prosecution, the firm, a target of a criminal
investigation, may itself admit to crimes by employees as part of a
settlement agreement with prosecutors. Corporations confess, and this
Article examines recent prosecution agreements in which they confess
and briefly considers the implications of such confessions. Such
confessions may increasingly be used to inculpate other entities and
employees. As a constitutional matter, however, such confessions may
not be considered coerced by the state. The Supreme Court has adopted
a "collective entity rule" that corporate persons, which lack any state of
mind, lack Fifth Amendment privilege. 1
The same is not the case for employees, the second subject of this
Article. Before itself confessing, the firm may encourage employees to
provide statements to law enforcement, placing some in a precarious
position of deciding whether to speak and incriminate themselves or
invoke Fifth Amendment privilege and not incriminate themselves, but
as a result face discipline or termination by their employer. The
question then arises whether the Fifth Amendment protects such
employees. This Article develops how criminal procedure offers scant
protection, while instead employment relationships structure
cooperation with law enforcement.
In response to a series of corporate governance scandals, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and federal prosecutors now investigate
corporate conduct and pursue charges against corporations and their
employees with far greater frequency than in the past.2 Following the
I See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988) ("[A] corporation has no Fifth
Amendment privilege .... ").
2 See Stephen Labaton, Downturn and Shift in Population Feed Boom in White-Collar
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002, § 1, at 11; Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution,
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January, 2003 DOJ guidelines known as the Thompson Memorandum,
updated in several revised Memoranda, federal prosecutors typically
defer prosecution if a firm will agree to adopt compliance programs,
admit its guilt, and more controversial, cooperate with any investigation
or prosecution of current or former employees.3 Criminal defense
attorneys, legislators and several legal scholars have complained that in
doing so, prosecutors use their leverage over the corporation to "coerce"
statements from vulnerable employees. 4 Several scholars who have
examined the issue in more depth have concluded the Fifth Amendment
does not readily apply to such criminal investigations. 5
The legal contention underlying the controversy, premised on the
Supreme Court's line of "penalty cases"' 6 beginning with Garrity v. New
Jersey,7 is that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) [hereinafter Garrett, Structural Reform].
3 See infra note 15.
4 Practitioners and some scholars have argued that the penalty cases apply to the DOJ's
charging policies, though typically only in a conclusory fashion. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n et al.,
Task Force On Attorney-Client Privilege: Report to the House of Delegates 17 (2006), available
at http://www.abanet.org/media/docs/302Brevised.pdf (stating that the DOJ's charging practices
"can also result in the organization's Employees being unfairly deprived of their Constitutional
rights to decline to be interviewed by government investigators and to seek the assistance of
counsel before speaking with the government."); Nicolas Grabar, Interim Report Of The
Committee On Capital Markets Regulation, 1601 PLI/CORP 11, 113 (2007) ("because the cost of
defending complex criminal prosecutions is so severe, a decision not to advance attorneys' fees
effectively forces capitulation of individuals to prosecutorial demands, irrespective of guilt or
innocence, thus burdening Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights"); George Ellard,
Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 985, 991 (2005);
Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Deputation of
Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 122 (2003) ("Information gathered by the
corporation and subsequently disclosed to the government may circumvent an employee's Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination."); Colin P. Marks, Thompson/McNulty Memo
Internal Investigations: Ethical Concerns of the "Deputized" Counsel, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1065,
1095 (2007) ("If an employee consents to the interview and waives Fifth Amendment protections
only out of a fear of termination, it could be argued that the attorney is using methods of
obtaining evidence that violate the employee's constitutional rights."); Earl J. Silbert & Demme
Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of Corporate Privilege
Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 1238 (2006).
5 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311 (2007); Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the
Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613 (2007); Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their
Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 53 (2007). As will be developed further, none of these articles suggest that
existing law supports the type of extension of the penalty cases that critics of DOJ policy
describe. Without doing these excellent pieces justice, but rather to briefly state some of their
conclusions: Lisa Griffin argues that the penalty cases apply not at the charging stage, but in the
context of deferred prosecution agreements in which a complex formal relationship exists
between prosecutors and the entity; Sam Buell argues that an extension of the cases at the
charging stage is unsupported by case law and inadvisable for a range of practical and policy
reasons; and Preet Bharara describes why such an extension is unlikely, particularly given
Supreme Court rulings on other privilege issues in corporate prosecutions.
6 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 40 (2002).
7 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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is violated when a corporation threatened with indictment pressures
employees to provide statements to law enforcement. The pressure
applied is economic. The firm threatens to terminate uncooperative
employees or deny advancement of attorneys' fees. Many critics cited
to Judge Lewis A. Kaplan's July 2006 opinion in United States v. Stein,
finding that after the government "threatened KPMG with the corporate
equivalent of capital punishment," as a result, "KPMG took the only
course open to it," and "exerted substantial pressure on its employees to
waive their constitutional rights." 8  Judge Kaplan suppressed
inculpatory statements by two employees, decrying the use of the
Thompson Memo by prosecutors to produce "the exertion of enormous
economic power by the employer upon its employees to sacrifice their
constitutional rights."9 The president of the American Bar Association
called the Thompson Memorandum approach "an affront to the Bill of
Rights, particularly the Fifth Amendment."' 0 In response to this outcry,
Congress threatened legislation, and the DOJ has so far twice modified
the Thompson Memo."' Most recently, the Second Circuit affirmed
Kaplan's decision, holding that the factual findings that KPMG
disciplined employees due to prosecutors' conduct were not clearly
erroneous. 
12
This Article argues that despite widespread and justified concern
regarding the unenviable position employees may be placed in during
such criminal investigations, the legal contention that such a situation
violates the Fifth Amendment remains equivocal and of limited
application.' 3 Upon a closer examination, the penalty cases do not
readily apply to the situation confronting many white-collar defendants
facing potential criminal charges. The Court's rulings extend only to
situations in which the state statutes or orders directly threaten dire and
career-ending consequences upon employees for failing to waive
privilege. Second, the state action requirement cannot be satisfied if the
state does not directly impose any penalty and does not collaborate in
the firm's efforts to penalize employees, but rather considers the firm a
target. There may be state action, however, when a firm cooperates
with prosecutors, particularly in the implementation of a deferred
prosecution agreement. Third, private employee discipline may not
satisfy the heightened standard required to show involuntary waiver of
privilege in the non-custodial context.
8 U.S. v. Stein (Stein 11), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
9 Id. at 337.
10 Michael S. Greco, US Should Rethink Attorney-Client Policy, THE MONT. LAW., May
2006, at 24, 24.
11 See infra note 15.
12 U.S. v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
13 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, On the Prospects of Deterring Corporate Crime, 2 J. Bus. &
TECH. L. (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 1001707.
920 [Vol. 30:3
CORPORA TE CONFESSIONS
This Article hopes to reorient the debate by emphasizing the
primary role of employment relationships. Employees should receive
guidance on their rights, but statutory, regulatory and contractual
relationships inform employment relationships and primarily define
employee cooperation with criminal investigations. This Article
concludes examining protections non-constitutional in origin that better
safeguard employee rights, including Upjohn warnings, warnings of
possible conflicts of interest, and other related warnings. These
warnings are provided by employers primarily because such warnings
serve employer interests in avoiding uncertainty, waiver, and conflicts.
I. CONFESSIONS BY CORPORATIONS
Corporations not only confess, but they do so when facing
substantial government pressure from a threat of an indictment that may
have dire collateral consequences. Federal prosecutors appear to highly
value confessions by the entity itself and have secured admissions in
almost all deferred and non-prosecution agreements entered in recent
years. These confessions have not previously been examined.
However, not only do confessions by corporations receive no Fifth
Amendment protection, but they may themselves have dramatic
consequences for employees and for other corporations.
In the recent wave of corporate prosecutions, the DOJ, including
for these purposes the various U.S. Attorneys offices, typically suspends
prosecution of corporations before an indictment, much less a
conviction, by entering detailed agreements. The agreements impose a
series of compliance requirements, including admissions of
wrongdoing, payment of fines and restitution, and full cooperation with
prosecutors in ongoing investigations of individual current and former
employees. 14 Corporations can and do confess, through the statements
they make in such agreements. In the past this rarely arose, but the DOJ
has obtained increasingly detailed admissions as a matter of course
when securing such agreements.
The Thompson Memo, promulgated in January 2003, details the
14 For a description of this approach and analysis of agreements entered through 2007, see
Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 2. For updated data current through January 2008
presented in testimony to Congress, see Deferred Prosecution and Corporate Settlement
Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Commercial and Administrative Law of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (Mar. 11, 2008) (statement of Brandon L. Garrett),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_031108_2.html. The agreements
themselves have been posted on a UVA Law Library resource website, together with updated data
concerning such agreements. Prosecution Agreements, UVA LAW LIBRARY,
http://www.law.virginia.edu/agreements (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
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DOJ's approach towards charging organizations. 15 That Memo cited to
factors that should inform charging decisions, and though "timely and
voluntary" disclosure of wrongdoing is a factor, nowhere to be found is
a reference to admissions of guilt. Instead, the Memo emphasized the
importance of "the authenticity of a corporation's cooperation" and
reform efforts to create effective compliance programs. The
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, however, reward with a sentence
reduction a firm's "affirmative acceptance of responsibility" for its
criminal conduct.16
Despite no official guidance on the inclusion of admissions of
guilt, prosecutors find such admissions to be important to obtaining
lenient treatment. In reviewing all such agreements entered during the
first five years after the promulgation of the Thompson Memo in 2003,
almost all such deferred and non-prosecution agreements contained
admissions of wrongdoing or acceptance of responsibility for the
charged acts. Out of forty-two such agreements, only six did not
include such admissions. 17 Similarly, all but three of the 51 subsequent
agreements entered in 2007 through Fall 2008 contained admissions of
wrongdoing. 18
The KPMG agreement provides an example of a lengthy and quite
detailed corporate confession. The agreement begins with a section
titled "Acceptance of Responsibility for Violation of Law."' 19 That
section, stating that KPGM "[a]ssisted high net worth United States
citizens to evade United States individual income taxes on billions of
dollars in capital gain and ordinary income by developing, promoting
and implementing unregistered and fraudulent tax shelters," listed five
patterns of fraudulent and illegal conduct. The agreement then, in an
appended single-spaced, ten page statement of facts, describes the
conduct in detail, stating that it was "deliberately approved and
perpetrated at the highest levels of KPMG's tax management, and
involved dozens of KPMG partners and other personnel," and
recounting the development, marketing and the concealment of those
tax shelters from the IRS, together with the "false and fraudulent"
15 See Memorandum from Dep. Atty. Gen. Larry Thompson to United States Attorneys:
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, Part I.B (Jan. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dagfbusiness.organizations.pdf (hereinafter Thompson Memo).
16 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(g) (2006).
17 Those were the agreements with Adelphia Communications, Hitachi, NEC Corporation,
M.C.I, Royal Ahold, Stryker Orthopedics, and Tommy Hilfiger. See Prosecution Agreements,
supra note 14.
18 The Collins & Aikman, NetVersant and Omega Advisors agreements did not include an
acceptance of responsibility. See id.
19 Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, S.D.N.Y., to Robert S. Bennett, Attorney for




representations made concerning their legality.20
Notable among firms that did not sign such an agreement was
Arthur Andersen LLP, which apparently objected to entering a deferred
prosecution agreement in which it would admit wrongdoing and accept
responsibility as a firm.2' Having failed to reach an agreement,
Andersen was prosecuted and ultimately dissolved.22  That failed
negotiation provides some evidence of the importance that prosecutors
attach to the entity admission of guilt.
Why is that the case; what additional purpose does an admission of
guilt from an artificial entity serve? Perhaps prosecutors need not ask
any more of a corporation if it makes sufficient efforts to cooperate,
discipline responsible employees, fashion effective compliance
programs, and pay fines and restitution. Those acts could demonstrate
the corporation's "acceptance of responsibility" as an entity. There are
good reasons not to require a confession, and instead secure something
like a nolo contendere plea at the charging stage. 23 A confession brings
with it reputational costs to the corporation, though not to the degree
that it would if the corporation pleaded guilty and had a conviction.
Additional terms in these agreements shed light on why the
corporate confession may be so sought after. The agreements almost all
state that should the corporate breach the agreement, the DOJ may
unilaterally declare a breach and then prosecute. 24 The agreements
typically provide that as to its detailed admissions of wrongdoing, the
entity "agrees it will not contest the admissibility into evidence of the
Statement of Facts in any subsequent criminal proceedings occurring in
the event of a breach of this Agreement. ' 25 Should prosecutors declare
a breach and prosecute, they may rely fully on the admissions of
criminality. Thus, the confession provides prosecutors with enormous
leverage during the implementation of the agreement. As discussed
20 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, KPMG Statement of Facts (Aug. 26, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgstatementoffacts.pdf.
21 See Kathleen Brickey, Andersen's Fall From Grace, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 917, 945 n.48
(2003).
22 See generally id.
23 See John C. Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 441 (1981) (recommending use of
nolo contendere pleas in entity prosecutions as a possible means to avoid collateral
consequences).
24 See Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 2, at Part III.B. The SEC has similarly adopted
a policy that parties may not deny, in subsequent proceedings, the factual allegations from
complaints in prior SEC consent decrees. See also In re Marshall E. Melton and Asset Mgmt. &
Research, Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9865 (July 25, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/ia-2151 .htm.
25 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney's Office, S.D. Tex. (June 16,
2006), available at http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/67985.htm; see also Garrett, Structural Reform,
supra note 2, at Part III, regarding legal questions that may arise should prosecutors unilaterally
declare a breach of such an agreement.
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further below, the confession may provide prosecutors and regulators
with information they can use to exercise leverage over other
individuals and firms as well.
While corporations entering into deferred prosecution agreements
do so under government pressure, they can not be coerced into
admitting criminal acts, at least as a constitutional matter. Under the
"collective entity rule," corporate persons can not claim Fifth
Amendment privilege and thus lack any constitutional right to be free
from coercion.26 Even if the "collective entity rule" did not exist, no
privilege would likely apply regarding admissions made in a
prosecution agreement. Such agreements are contractual and entered at
arms-length during a bargaining process. This makes it all the more
surprising that not only do deferred prosecution agreements universally
contain admissions of guilt, but they also often state that the corporation
"is entering into this Agreement voluntarily," perhaps for public
relations purposes, or perhaps lifting language from similar agreements
involving individual defendants. 27
Individual people must sign the confession on behalf of the
corporation. The agreements are often signed by counsel and
sometimes also by officers of the corporation who affirm that they
entered into the agreement voluntarily, or they include documentation
of a board resolution. For example, in the Ingersoll-Rand deferred
prosecution agreement, the CEO signed a certificate stating that he was
"duly authorized by Ingersoll to execute this Agreement on behalf of
Ingersoll and all the subsidiaries named herein. ' '2 8 He then stated, "No
promises or inducements have been made other than those contained in
this Agreement. Furthermore, no one has threatened or forced me, or to
my knowledge any person . . . in any way to enter into this
agreement. '29 Similarly, counsel provided a certificate stating: "To my
knowledge, Ingersoll's decision to enter into this Agreement is an
informed and voluntary one."'30
A separate set of questions arise regarding the impact of such
admissions of wrongdoing in other prosecutions. The investigative
material obtained during the process of obtaining such admissions may
prove highly useful in prosecutions of individual defendants, and also
other corporations. In a subsequent prosecution of employees, the
entity admissions would be hearsay and would raise confrontation
26 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988) ("[A] corporation has no Fifth
Amendment privilege .... "),
27 See, e.g., Boeing Deferred Prosecution Agreement para. 5 (June 30, 2006), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/boeing.pdf.
28 Ingersoll-Rand Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Officer's Certificate (Oct. 10, 2007),
available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/ingersollrand.pdf.
29 Id.
30 Id., Certificate of Counsel.
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clause problems, but could be used as impeachment to cross-examine
the entity that confessed, presumably through an authorized
representative. 31 Questions of employee discipline may arise. Some of
the agreements require cooperation and also that employees not
contradict the entity admissions; doing so might place the corporation in
breach of the agreement and then subject to prosecution. 32 For example,
the Pfizer agreement states that not only does the entity "expressly and
unequivocally admit ... that it knowingly, intentionally and willfully
committed the crime charged in the Information," but that "Pfizer Inc.
will not make any public statement contradicting anything set forth in"
the Information. 33 Employees may therefore be reluctant to assist the
defense; as defense attorneys have pointed out, though enforcement of
such terms might undermine the credibility of the prosecution case. 34
Of far more use to prosecutors seeking to leverage their limited
resources, may be the use of entity confessions to support prosecutions
of other corporations. 35 In cases involving industry collusion, one
player after another might be targeted, or less culpable corporate
partners might be targeted first, to go after the "big fish" among a
number of corporations. Questions will arise whether and under what
circumstances prosecutors may use the statements or information
provided by the cooperating entity to support such entity prosecutions. 36
The admissions of the corporation may include information gleaned
from internal and government investigations and quite detailed accounts
of wrongdoing. Prosecutors could make powerful use of that
information in subsequent prosecutions of another firm, or of another
firm's employees. In recent cases, prosecutors have begun to do just
31 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Paul Marcus, Re-evaluating Large Multiple-
Defendant Criminal Prosecutions, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 67 (2002).
32 See Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin Jr., "Queen for a Day" or "Courtesan for a
Day ": The Sixth Amendment Limits to Proffer Agreements, 15 No. 9 WHITE-COLLAR CRIME REP.
1 (2001), U.S. v. Duff', 133 F. Supp. 2d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Leonard Post, Deferred
Prosecution Deal Raises Objections, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 30, 2006, at 4, available at
http://www.law.comljsp/ihc/PubArticlelHC.jsp?id= 1138788312206; Brandon L. Garrett, Essay,
United States v. Goliath, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 105, 107-08 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/06/18/garrett.pdf [hereinafter Garrett, Goliath]
(describing cooperation requirements in deferred prosecution agreements).
33 See Side Letter Agreement with Pfizer (Mar. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/pfizer.pdf.
34 See Post, supra note 32 (quoting Stephanie Martz of the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, while noting that "the threat to witnesses of being fired if they don't adhere to
a government-approved truth could backfire on prosecutors. 'Not a single employee is going to
be a credible witness."').
35 On the lack of federal resources and resulting "radical underenforcement," see Daniel C.
Richman & William J. Stuntz, Essay, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy
of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 613-14 (2005).
36 See Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 2, at 867 (regarding possible use of these
admissions by the IRS and the DOJ).
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that.37 Again, no Fifth Amendment issues arise as to such detailed
admissions of an entity's wrongdoing, but such statements may prove
highly valuable to the government in corporate prosecutions.
II. CONFESSIONS BY INDIVIDUALS AND THE PENALTY CASES
A. DOJ Guidelines and the KPMG Case
The confessions that have attracted controversy are not those of the
corporation, but those of the individual current or former employees
who provide statements during a criminal investigation. As to those
sorts of inculpatory statements, the Fifth Amendment's application
remains murkier. The DOJ's prosecution agreements not only place a
focus on structural reform, but they also facilitate the prosecution of the
individual employees deemed to have played the most serious role, who
after all, may be punished with fewer collateral consequences to
blameless employees and shareholders. Thus, the Thompson Memo
emphasized that the "[p]rosecution of a corporation is not a substitute
for the prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without
the corporation" and that "[o]nly rarely should provable individual
culpability not be pursued, even in the face of offers of corporate guilty
pleas." 38
Unlike in the typical criminal case, federal prosecutors provided
advance guidance on what sorts of cooperation they value. The
Thompson Memo listed as factors, "the adequacy of the prosecution of
individuals responsible for the company's malfeasance" and "the
corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents. ' 39 The Memo
elaborated: "Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether
the corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees and
agents." The Memo added that:
[W]hile cases will differ depending on the circumstances, a
corporation's promise of support to culpable employees and agents,
either through the advancing of attorneys fees, through retaining the
employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through
37 See United States v. Stolt-Nielsen, 524 F. Supp. 2d 609, 627-28 (E.D. Pa. 2007) ("When
Stolt-Nielsen approached the Division in November 2002 to report its antitrust violations, the
Division did not have sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of any company in the parcel
tanker industry. Using highly incriminating evidence produced by Stolt-Nielsen and its
employees, including the 'combined lists' provided by Wingfield, the Division obtained the
benefit of its bargain-it successfully dismantled the cartel and secured guilty pleas from Stolt-
Nielsen's co-conspirators which included prison terms and fines totaling $62 million.").
38 See Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at Part I.B.
39 Id. at Part II.A.
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providing information to the employees about the government's
investigation pursuant to a joint defense agreement, may be
considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent and value of a
corporation's cooperation. 40
The Securities and Exchange Commission and other federal agencies
similarly use such cooperation as an important consideration when they
decide whether to impose civil penalties on a firm during regulatory
action.4 1
Prosecution emphasis on corporate cooperation sparked a
remarkable outcry amongst the bar, a few scholars, and in Congress,
which has pending legislation that would forbid rewarding a corporation
for its waiver of attorney-client privilege and securing employee
cooperation by terminating wrongdoing employees.42 Most of the
outcry centered on pressure to waive attorney-client privilege, sensibly
so from a defense perspective, because the documents prepared by
counsel may be central to the government's case. 43 While corporate
crime prosecutions remain highly document dependent, 44 employee or
former employee testimony can provide a critical piece in the
government's case. Further, as George Cohen notes, "[t]he main
motivation for employees to cooperate with corporate investigations has
always been the threat of being fired or incurring other job-related
consequences, not the corporate privilege. '45 This Article examines
such pressures applied on employees.
Commentators argue that federal prosecutors coerce cooperation of
firms, which in turn pressure employees to provide statements to
prosecutors, or risk non-advancement or non-payment of legal fees,
which can be substantial in complex white collar prosecutions. In
40 Id., at Part VI.B.
41 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-
4.htm ("The degree to which a corporation has self reported an offense, or otherwise cooperated
with the investigation and remediation of the offense, is a factor that the Commission will
consider in determining the propriety of a corporate penalty."); in re Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenenr & Smith, Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-12236 (Mar. 13, 2006) (imposing fine in part due
to non-cooperation during investigation, citing failure to promptly produce and retain emails); see
also Garrett, Structural Reform, supra note 2, at Part II.A.
42 See Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
43 The outcry may not have been entirely justified, as DOJ practice was far from uniformly
insistent on waiver; between the time the Thompson Memo was released in 2003 and 2007, "the
DOJ did not seek privilege waiver in many of its agreements, though it did seek privilege waiver
in the majority, or twenty agreements (fifty-seven percent)." Garrett, Structural Reform, supra
note 2, at 900.
44 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 (1988) ("The greater portion of evidence
of wrongdoing by an organization or its representatives is usually found in the official records
and documents of that organization.") (internal quotation omitted).
45 See George M. Cohen, Essay, Of Coerced Waiver, Government Leverage, and Corporate
Loyalty: The Holder, Thompson, and McNulty Memos and Their Critics, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF
153, 160 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/23/cohen.pdf.
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response to the outcry, the DOJ revised its Thompson Memo guidelines;
the 2006 McNulty Memo stated that prosecutors "generally should not
take into account" payment of legal fees and must seek approval from
the Deputy Attorney General to do so, though leaving unchanged
considering failure to terminate non-cooperating employees and
existence of a joint defense agreement. 46 The latest iteration of the
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, the 2008
Filip Memo, changed this language to make a far clearer statement
forbidding consideration of employee compensation or discipline. The
Memo states that "prosecutors should not take into account whether a
corporation is advancing or reimbursing attorneys' fees or providing
counsel to employees, officers or directors under indictment. '47 The
Memo adds, "Likewise, prosecutors may not request that a corporation
refrain from taking such action. '48 The Memo does not, however,
address termination or other discipline of employees.
Few have asserted Fifth Amendment claims, where most
employees, blameless or not, assist in an investigation voluntarily,49 and
the overwhelming majority of employees who prosecutors do pursue,
just as their employer does, plead guilty and then cooperate.50 Current
regulations encourage "layering" of internal investigations, with
simultaneous efforts that may include: audits conducted by audit
committees; independent investigations by the board and board
committees; internal investigations by the management employing in-
house or outside counsel; and compliance with "real-time"
investigations by regulators.51  Following such compliance efforts,
preventative measures may be adopted and discipline may be imposed,
including firing uncooperative employees and refusing to pay their legal
46 Memorandum from Paul J. MeNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memo], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf.
47 See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,
Title 9, Chapter 9-28.730, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-
guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Filip Memo].
48 Id.
49 See Buell, supra note 5, at 1648-49.
50 See Kathleen F. Brickey, In Enron's Wake: Corporate Executives On Trial, 96 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 397 (2006) (developing data regarding prosecutions of corporate executives
showing that ninety percent pleaded guilty, "virtually all" of whom became cooperating witnesses
for the government, often in trials of "high-level executives"). A typical case is the recent guilty
plea of three top members of Oxycontin-maker Purdue Pharma, along with the entity's plea
agreement and non-prosecution agreement involving adoption of compliance measures. See
Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 million, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2007,
at C2.
51 See Robert S. Bennett, Alan Kriegel, Carl S. Rauh & Charles F. Walker, Internal
Investigations and the Defense of Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62 BUS. LAW. 55
(2006); Harvey L. Pitt, SEC Chairman, Remarks at PLI 33rd Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation (Nov. 8, 2001), http:// www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch520.htm.
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fees. Any Fifth Amendment claims would be litigated only in cases in
which the employer makes efforts to secure employee cooperation after
prosecutors become involved, and where employees do agree to provide
statements, they are prosecuted, but they do not plead guilty but rather
proceed to trial.
The KPMG prosecution provided the example that focused
criticisms of these policies. Contributing to a revival of interest in the
Supreme Court's line of "penalty cases," Judge Kaplan found that two
KPMG employees, one a senior vice-chair and the other a junior
partner, made statements based on pressure to cooperate or lose
advancement of up to $400,000 in legal fees, and that this was coercion
violating the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-
incrimination. 52 Both employees had made statements to prosecutors
after signing proffer agreements, which receive a strong presumption of
voluntariness.5 3 The vice-chair had initially refused to proffer, but
according to Judge Kaplan, changed course "acting against the advice of
his attorney and in order to keep his job" after the government reported
his non-cooperation to KPMG, which in turn "implicitly but
unmistakably threatened to fire him if he did not fall into line. '54 The
junior partner had provided three separate statements under proffer
agreements, according to the court, viewing himself as a whistleblower
cooperating with the investigation, but also "because he could not afford
to pay for what he regarded as an adequate defense. '55
The court found that KPMG's conduct was "fairly attributable"
to the government, 56 and that this pressure was applied on the two
employees because the U.S. Attorney's Office "threatened also to
consider any failure by KPMG to cause its employees to make full
disclosure to the government as favoring indictment. '57 Judge Kaplan
later dismissed the indictments against those two employees and eleven
others on other grounds, citing to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
as affected by KPMG's failure to advance employee legal fees so it is
unclear whether the Second Circuit will take up the Fifth Amendment
issue.58
52 See United States. v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); U.S. v.
Stein (Stein 11), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
53 See Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d. at 321 n.20 (The agreements stated "the government may not
use the statement in its case-in-chief, but it is free to use leads obtained from it and may use the
statement on cross-examination and in a variety of other circumstances."); Benjamin A. Naftalis,
"Queen For A Day " Agreements And The Proper Scope Of Permissible Waiver Of The Federal
Plea-Statement Rules, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (2003).
54 Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d. at 322, 330.
55 Id. at 323.
56 Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 334.
57 Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d. at 318.
58 U.S. v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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The Second Circuit did not take up the Fifth Amendment issue in
its ruling. Largely because it found not clearly erroneous Judge
Kaplan's factual findings that "but for the Thompson Memorandum and
the prosecutors' conduct, KPMG would have advanced legal fees
without condition or cap," the Second Circuit affirmed the finding of a
Sixth Amendment violation.5 9
B. Revisiting the Penalty Cases
In the Supreme Court's line of penalty cases, the Court stated that
"threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional
reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion" and
that those goods can not in some circumstances be constitutionally
conditioned on a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 60 Some
commentators have similarly argued in response to the KPGM decision
and recent corporate prosecutions that the penalty cases should apply in
corporate prosecutions. 61 The penalty cases deserve closer examination.
The Supreme Court in Garrity v. New Jersey first held that the
Fifth Amendment supported exclusion absent coercion during a
custodial interrogation, where under a state statute, police officers
would be have their employment terminated should they not cooperate
with a criminal investigation. 62 The Court then extended Garrity to
other contexts, ranging from an attorney disbarred by a court order for
failure to comply with a subpoena, in Spevach v. Klein63; independent
contractors, threatened with statutory disqualification from government
contracting for five years if the did not waive privilege and answer
questions, in Lefkowitz v. Turley;64 and an unsalaried political party
official, facing statutory disqualification from public office for five
years absent refusal to waive Fifth Amendment privilege, in Lejkowitz
v. Cunningham.65
In a further and not uncontroversial extension of the doctrine,
appellate courts have given the penalty cases greater force by treating
statements found to be coerced by such penalties to be subject not just
to exclusion, but to a "Garrity immunity" such that, like immunized
statements they are not just suppressed in their use at trial, but also in
59 U.S. v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2008).
60 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967).
61 See supra notes 4-5.
62 385 U.S. 493 (1967); see also Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r of
Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (finding unconstitutional discharge of public employees for
asserting Fifth Amendment privilege).
63 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
64 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
65 431 U.S. 801, 807 (1977).
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their derivative use, along with any fruits of the affected testimony.66
The penalty cases remain distinctive in a number of respects. They
each involved state action; they each involved a penalty of severe
economic harm threatening livelihood; they each involved action upon
an individual and not a separate charged entity; none involved
negotiated agreements like proffer agreements; and they all involved a
context specific analysis of voluntariness.
1. State Action and Charging Decisions
State action was present in each of the penalty cases, because in
each of those cases, the government itself sought to extract information
by using the threat of a penalty, either through the direct operation of
state statutes or, in Spevach, a court order. In contrast, the typical
corporate prosecution will not involve state action during the charging
stage, where any "cooperation" is not the product of joint interests and
participation in a common project. Prosecutors pursue cases as
adversaries and not as allies. A firm in a corporate prosecution will
typically remain a prosecution target, given broad respondeat superior
standards. 67 Prior to entering a deferred prosecution or plea agreement,
the firm's interests will typically not be aligned with but opposed to the
government's.
The Supreme Court admits that "[w]hat is fairly attributable" to the
state "is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid
simplicity. '68 Clear cases of state action include the situation where the
state delegated a public function to private persons or controlled a
private entity using explicit or implicit orders.69 In more muddled
relationships between state and private actors, the Court has found state
action if the government had "pervasive entwinement" 70 with relevant
operations of the private entity, or exercised "coercive power."'71
Though not uncontroversially so, decisions adopt a narrow view of
circumstances required to find a private entity a joint participant with
the state, in part to avoid undue extension of constitutional regulation to
private entities. 72 Based on these state action rulings, in the white collar
66 See Steven D. Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity,
76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1309, 1329-30 (2001).
67 See N.Y. Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
68 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
72 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (requiring "close
nexus between the State and the challenged action" such that seemingly private behavior "may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself').
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crime context, lower courts have held that no Fifth Amendment issues
arise as to interviews conducted even by heavily regulated private
actors, such as the National Association of Securities Dealers. 73
During the charging stage, far from being a partner of the
prosecution, the corporate employer not only remains a target, but risks
committing the additional crime of obstruction of justice if it does not
ensure that its employees do not hinder the investigation. Obstruction
of justice charges led to the demise of Anderson; such charges may also
be far easier to prove than the underlying fraud.74 The firm could also
be responsible if employees do not remain silent, but make false
statements to investigators-including the mere denial of the
commission of a crime. 75 While employees may be placed between a
rock and a hard place, the entire firm shares that unenviable position.
Causation might be difficult to show, where employers have good
reasons to themselves independently desire to discipline non-
cooperative employees, even apart from any pending investigation and
avoidance of secondary crimes. As discussed next, employer discipline
may be permitted for any reason in an at-will state. The firm may also
desire to avoid employee assertion of Fifth Amendment rights not just
due to criminal but also civil consequences. 76
Finally, to the extent the government took any action at all in
promulgating the Thompson, and McNulty and now Filip memos, it
publicly announced not a penalty, but factors to be considered in its
purely discretionary exercise as to charging, an area in which
prosecutors traditionally have almost unlimited legal latitude.77
73 See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975); D.L. Cromwell Invests.,
Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. v. Stein (Stein I1),
440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 335-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
74 Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (found guilty of violating 18
U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006)). "These sections make it a crime to knowingly use
intimidation or physical force, threaten, or corruptly persuade another person with intent to cause
that person to withhold documents from, or alter documents for use in, an official proceeding."
Id. at 698 (internal quotations omitted); see also John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White
Collar Crime, 54 AM. U.L. REV. 579, 618-19 (2005).
75 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006); Richman &
Stuntz, supra note 35, at 637 (criticizing the Court's broad interpretation of the false statement
statute to include a mere denial of guilt).
76 In any civil litigation, Fifth Amendment invocations by employees may result in an adverse
inference drawn against the corporation, even if the employees were terminated. See, e.g., FDIC
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 45 F.3d 969 (5th Cir. 1995); Cerro Gordo Charity v. Fireman's Fund
Am. Life Ins. Co., 819 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir. 1987); Rad Servs. Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 808
F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1986); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1984);
Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983).
77 To the extent that the ruling in Stein II was based on any direct threats found to have been
made, prosecutors can simply in the future avoid any reference during negotiations to employee
discipline. After all, general statements of principle such as in the McNulty Memo send the
desired message, but without using direct coercion. Judge Kaplan found that the U.S. Attorney's
Office "threatened also to consider any failure by KPMG to cause its employees to make full
disclosure to the government as favoring indictment." Stein II, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
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To find state action under such circumstances extends the concept
of state action beyond its farthest limits: beyond the Supreme Court's
penalty cases, which applied only to state statutes and judicial orders;
applying the notion to firms that are the targets of criminal prosecutions
with adverse interests to the government; and finding action where the
government exercised purely discretionary charging decisions.
Supposing state action extended to such adversarial and ill-formed
situations as fluid as the investigation and negotiation that leads to a
charging decision, prosecutors could never be certain which employees
a judge might later determine were coerced under the totality of the
circumstances, thus tainting an entire prosecution. 78
The Second Circuit did find state action in its Stein decision.
However, it did so largely in deference to the factual findings of the
lower court, which determined that "the government forced KPMG to
adopt its constricted Fees Policy. ' 79 Withdrawal of attorneys' fees more
directly implicates a Sixth Amendment right to counsel than the Fifth
Amendment right related to employee statements discussed here. The
Second Circuit did, however, include broad language on state action
suggesting that though a target of a prosecution is typically an
adversary, "The government's threat of indictment was easily sufficient
to convert its adversary into its agent."'80
In addition to the factual findings from the lower court, the Second
Circuit relied upon language in the Thompson Memo stating that one
factor to be considered in whether to prosecute a corporation is whether
that corporation shields, or "appears to be protecting its culpable
employees and agents." 81 That entire paragraph on "Shielding Culpable
Employees and Agents" was eliminated in the section on cooperation in
the new Filip Memo. 82 The Thompson Memo discussed the issue of
Regardless, a threat to consider does not make for a direct showing of coercion. This is
particularly so where indictment would be a legitimate course; prosecutors have no obligation to
offer leniency to a target entity. Possible withdrawal of a discretionary benefit to an employer is
very different from a penalty the state directed at an employee, for state action purposes at least.
78 As Sam Buell describes, further problems arise, where "(1) civil regulatory agencies,
beyond the control and knowledge of criminal authorities, often investigate and take statements in
a matter before it progresses to the criminal stage; and (2) a firm and its employees would have
the ability and the motive to confer 'Garrity immunity' and cause that immunity to permeate the
state's enforcement efforts by disseminating immunized statements." See Buell, supra note 5, at
1645. Garrity immunity, if extended to such ambiguous situations, might require prosecutors to
adopt in all corporate prosecutions, the cumbersome technique adopted in police misconduct
cases in which the trial team of prosecutors can only examine evidence vetted and approved by a
separate "Garrity team" that first investigates any potentially coerced statements. For analysis of
this problem in police misconduct prosecutions, see Clymer, supra note 66, at 1332 ("Without a
clear warning, prosecutors and investigators may overlook the possibility that Garrity immunity
has attached and thus neglect to avoid exposure or take other precautions.").
79 U.S. v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 148 (2d Cir. 2008).
80 Id. at 151.
81 Id. at 148.
82 Filip Memo, supra note 47, at 7.
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making employees available for interviews. It stated that prosecutors
will consider whether the firm "engaged in conduct that impedes the
investigation" for example by "inappropriate directions to employees or
their counsel, such as directions not to cooperate openly and fully with
the investigation including, for example, the direction to decline to be
interviewed. ' 83 In contrast, the Filip Memo now steers clear of any
consideration whether employees participated in interviews. It instead
states that examples of obstruction "could include: inappropriate
directions to employees or their counsel, such as directions not to be
truthful or to conceal relevant facts; making representations or
submissions that contain misleading assertions or material omissions;
and incomplete or delayed production of records. '84 Thus, DOJ has
allayed potential Fifth Amendment concerns arising from language in
the Thompson and McNulty Memos.
Further, the reason the Second Circuit found state action was that
Judge Kaplan had found that KPMG did not have a clear policy on
advancement of attorneys fees, and that the prosecutors themselves
secured the KPMG decision to condition payment of fees on
cooperation with the government.85 Even assuming prosecutors were to
take such a heavy handed approach in a case after Stein (and doing so
would be contrary to the Filip Memo), they could only impose policy
where a corporation like KPMG had no existing policy on say,
employee interviews, and instead merely followed the Government's
lead, or where the corporation changed pre-existing policies due to
government pressure.
Now, if a corporation does change pre-existing corporate
compliance policies regarding employee interviews to accede to
prosecution demands, then perhaps state action exists. Such situations
may be far more likely to occur where a corporation has deficient
compliance programs, and is then subject to a deferred or non-
prosecution agreement designed to overhaul such procedures. Thus, far
more interesting state action questions, explored by Lisa Griffin, will
arise during internal investigations supervised by monitors established
by deferred prosecution agreements, non prosecution agreement, or plea
agreements with prosecutors. 86  Such agreements typically contain
terms requiring the entity to hire monitors chosen by the prosecutors
with sweeping powers to remedy any persistent criminality. 87 Those
83 Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at VI(B).
84 Filip Memo, supra note 47, at 9-28.730.
85 Stein, 541 F.3d at 148-50.
86 Lisa Griffin develops how although otherwise state action might be "more attenuated"
during an internal investigation, it is more readily observed when employer discipline is
"according to the express requirements in a DPA." Griffin, supra note 5, at 358, 368.
87 For a description of those agreements and the powers they provide to monitors, see Garrett,
Structural Reform, supra note 2, at Parts IA, II.A-B; regarding ongoing cooperation obligations,
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monitors report to prosecutors but are paid by the corporation. So far,
in the years since these agreements have been entered into, no
individual prosecutions arose from inquiries conducted under such
agreements. 88 If new individual prosecutions were to result, however,
such a contractual monitoring agreement may very well render the firm
a state actor.
2. The Voluntariness Inquiry and Private Employer Discipline
The Fifth Amendment's voluntariness test must also be satisfied.
The court must find that the individual's will was overborne based on
an objective and subjective inquiry into the totality of the
circumstances. 89 In the KPMG case, all of the defendants but two,
Judge Kaplan ruled, failed to satisfy that test.90 In the penalty cases, the
Supreme Court did not clearly apply its modem voluntariness test, in
part because those decisions mostly precede its modern jurisprudence.
The Court did state, however, that mere economic pressure is not
enough, but that it must rise to the level of coercion, and must therefore
be "substantial," tantamount to "economic catastrophe," similar to the
"end of their police careers" that the plaintiffs in Garrity faced, or the
disbarment faced in Spevack.91 More recently, the Court's plurality
took a narrower view in summarizing that "[t]hose cases.., involved
free citizens given the choice between invoking the Fifth Amendment
privilege and sustaining their economic livelihood. '92 That formulation
does expand the type of impermissible state penalty from loss of public
employment to other severe economic harm, but the harm must be
see also Garrett, Goliath, supra note 32.
88 Indeed, in at least one case, the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey case,
although the monitor uncovered substantial new criminality, the deferred prosecution agreement
was permitted to expire with no new prosecution announced. Josh Margolin and Ted Sherman,
UMDNJ Trustees Vote to Take Back the Reins, Christie to End Monitorship After Board Declines
Offer to Continue, THE STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 14, 2007, at 31.
89 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) ("In determining whether a
defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
interrogation.."); see also Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward
a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465 (2005).
90 U.S. v. Stein (Stein II), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
91 U.S. ex. rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 500 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82 (1973). Of course, in Turley, the Court did not require loss of livelihood.
The independent contractors in Turley faced only five years of disqualification from state
contracts, only one source of income, albeit a lucrative one. The Court noted, however, that the
effects swept far more broadly where any firm that employed such a contractor under the New
York statute at issue would itself be subject to disqualification. Id. at 84. Similarly, Cunningham
involved a five year disqualification from public office combined with resulting severe effects on
reputation. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804 (1977).
92 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 40 (2002).
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severe.
Employer discipline short of such harm may not satisfy the Fifth
Amendment standard. For example, denial of advance payment of
attorneys fees is not "economic catastrophe" within the meaning of the
penalty cases, though of course of critical importance to the employees
facing prosecution. It is the private withdrawal of a discretionary
benefit and not a state penalty. 93 If it were to be provided based on a
contractual obligation, the firm could not withdraw payment (without
facing a likely meritorious breach of contract suit). 94 While all criminal
defendants would benefit from the ability to afford the attorney of their
choice, most defendants lack the luxury of an employer that advances
legal fees. 95 A threat to fire, on the other hand, if it could be attributed
to the government, could depending on the circumstances, satisfy the
penalty cases definition of coercion given a substantial threat,
tantamount to career-ending consequences.
A separate question remains whether the penalty cases, all decided
decades ago, can be squared with the Court's more recent voluntariness
jurisprudence. 96 The Court's Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is far
93 The evidence KPMG had some kind of implied contract based on unwritten prior practice
may also be quite thin. See Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753, 762 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007)
("KPMG's alleged 'uniform practice,' . .. of paying the legal fees for indicted employees and
partners-seemingly an indispensable element of an 'implied-in-fact' contract-appears to
consist of a single instance in which KPMG paid the legal fees of two partners indicted and
convicted in a 1974 criminal case .... What is more, when the appellees moved to dismiss the
indictment on Sixth Amendment grounds, they took the position that the payment of legal fees
was a matter of KPMG's freedom of choice, stipulating with the government that 'it had been the
longstanding voluntary practice of KPMG to advance and pay legal fees."') (emphasis added and
citations omitted). Judge Kaplan found "KPMG long had paid legal fees for any of its employees
who were sued or charged with crimes as a result of doing their jobs . Stein II, 440 F.
Supp.2d at 318.
94 Stein, 486 F.3d at 762 ("One aspect of that policy was to take into account whether the firm
was voluntarily paying the legal expenses of members or employees who had been indicted, see
Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at 7-8, a factor deemed to favor indictment under the Thompson
Memorandum. Id. That document gave no such weight to payments required by contract."
(citations replaced with internal cross references); see also Nishchay H. Maskay, The
Constitutionality of Federal Restrictions on the Indemnification of Attorneys' Fees, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 491 (2007).
95 In the decision ultimately dismissing most of the indictments, Judge Kaplan explained:
This is not to say that attorneys appointed under the CJA inevitably could not provide
the minimally effective defense that the Constitution requires. That is unclear, one
way or the other. But it is to say that defendants would be wiped out financially as a
result of the government's actions before they became eligible for CJA representation
and that the representation they would receive in that event would be constrained in
ways that would not have obtained absent the government's interference.
U.S. v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Kaplan argued that the constitution,
based on a substantive due process theory of his innovation, "prevents the government from
interfering if a criminal defendant is fortunate enough to have someone who is willing to give the
defendant the money to pay for a defense, even a very expensive one." Id. at 425.
96 For an excellent treatment of the issue, see Clymer, supra note 66, at 1344-46 ("Although
some older decisions suggest that confessions that are not the result of free will should be
suppressed regardless of the methods police used to obtain them, the Court repudiated that view
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from doctrinally uniform, and the Supreme Court has not itself sorted
out how the penalty cases fit in with the main body of its self-
incrimination jurisprudence. 97  One possibility is that coercion is
analyzed more generously where the threats are economic outside the
custodial setting. That result would be highly perverse, given the core
purpose of the Fifth Amendment to protect against physical and
psychological torture. 98 Indeed, in its only recent decision revisiting the
penalty cases, the Court ruled that requiring inmates to self-inculpate as
part of participation in a sex-offender program as a condition of parole
did not implicate the Fifth Amendment, noting the two poles regarding
"the physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects"
and "the de minimis harms against which it does not."99
The Court is deferential to bargaining that occurs when employees
decide whether to provide proffers and prosecutors decide whether to
extend leniency or immunity. 00 The Court has also expressed the
policy concern in Braswell v. United States, with avoiding "a
detrimental impact on the government's efforts to prosecute 'white-
collar crime,' one of the most serious problems confronting law
enforcement authorities."' 101
The Supreme Court also arguably ratcheted the standard for
showing coercion and the causal nexus between state action and
coercion in Colorado v. Connelly, a case in which the defendant
suffered from severe delusions and thought he was hearing the "voice of
God" during his interrogation (after confessing, he was medicated for
six months before found competent to stand trial for murder). 02
Nevertheless, the Court found that where no pressure was applied to
him, there was no "essential link between coercive activity of the State,
on the one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant, on the
in Colorado v. Connelly. There, the Court held that police misconduct is a prerequisite for
finding that a confession violates due process.").
97 Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its
Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 243-45 (2004); William J. Stuntz, Self-
Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (1988). Justice O'Connor
acknowledged the lack of coherent doctrine in this area in McKune:
Forcing defendants to accept such consequences seems to me very different from
imposing penalties for the refusal to incriminate oneself that go beyond the criminal
process and appear, starkly, as government attempts to compel testimony; in the latter
context, any penalty that is capable of compelling a person to be a witness against
himself is illegitimate. But even this explanation of the privilege is incomplete, as it
does not fully account for all of the Court's precedents in this area.
536 U.S. at 53 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98 However, such a divergence would fit in with a range of means by which our system treats
white-collar crime differently than street crime. See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate
Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1295 (2001).
99 McKune, 536 U.S. at 41.
100 United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 207 (1995).
101 For a careful discussion of these decisions, see Bharara, supra note 5, at 100.
102 479 U.S. 157, 161 (1986); id. at 175 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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other." 10 3 The Court added that "[t]he most outrageous behavior by a
private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not
make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process Clause."' 0 4
Whether the Court's decision was defensible as a matter of Fifth
Amendment law, its reasoning, demanding a close link between state
action, coercion and the confession produced, supports a view that the
Court would not today extend the penalty cases.
To conclude, the state action doctrine does not support finding
private employment decisions made during criminal investigations to be
state action, absent a formal cooperation agreement with prosecutors or
perhaps a change in corporation policy at the government's behest. Nor
would coercion be easily shown, at least as to denial of attorneys fees.
Further, sound practical reasons counsel against such a regime. For
exclusion to apply to mere implicit encouragement to target entities to
discipline potentially culpable employees would extend the penalty
cases to any number of routine employment decisions made under the
shadow of criminal investigations. 10 5 The consequences could hamper
corporate crime prosecutions and disrupt corporate governance.10 6
103 Id. at 165.
104 Id. The Court found that exclusion serves no purpose under such circumstances, noting a
lack of a concern with reliability (surprising, when assessing with statements by a delusional
person), but also that exclusion would not in such circumstances "substantially deter future
violations of the Constitution." Id. at 166. The Court concluded that "[w]e hold that coercive
police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 167.
105 As Sam Buell explains:
A rule turning on economic detriment, aside from being a severe departure from
existing Garrity doctrine, would be unmanageable. An employee would be able to
manipulate virtually any interaction with the employer over a questioning issue into a
case of suppression, by forcing the employer to threaten some consequence to the
employee. Such a rule would be overbroad in relation to the interests that might justify
extending Garrity. And it would lead to spillover problems in other areas of Fifth
Amendment doctrine turning on compulsion.
Buell, supra note 5, at 1642-43.
106 However, the Court ruled in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), that improper
admission of concededly unconstitutionally admitted confession statements may be harmless
error. In that case, the parties agreed that Fulminante made statements to an inmate who was
acting as an agent for the government, and the Court accepted the state court's conclusion that he
faced a credible threat of physical violence from which the agent-inmate promised protection. Id.
at 287 n.4. In document-intensive white collar prosecutions, particularly where the entity is
cooperating and providing access to witnesses and documents, even improper admission
employee statements and their fruits may be harmless error.
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III. PRIVATE CONTRACT AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
A. Employment Relationships During Criminal Investigations
High-level employees face enormous pressure from all sides
during an investigation, from supervisors within the corporate
employer, corporate counsel, independent auditors, the Board, state and
federal regulators, civil litigants, and finally from prosecutors. Any
relationship formed with law enforcement, such as pursuant to a proffer
agreement, adds only one final layer above a series of contractual
obligations that govern employee status within the firm. Focusing on
criminal procedure, specifically the Fifth Amendment, distracts from
more important sources for employee protections. Employee
relationships are primarily structured by employment contracts with
agents together with employment law regulation of such contracts.
Further, firms can and will contract around criminal procedure rules,
perhaps in ways that undermine effectiveness of any criminal procedure
rule.
The background norm against which relations between employees
and firms are analyzed remains at-will employment in most states. 107
For good reasons, employment contracts have not protected a norm of
anti-retaliation for employee silence during investigations of potentially
criminal malfeasance. In some cases, the ability to fire wrongdoing
employees may be limited by union contracts, or by employment
contracts negotiated by high-level officers. Employees also have a duty
of loyalty, or a duty to cooperate with their employer, included in
statutes in most states and interpreted as implicit in any employment
relationship in other states. 108 Unless the employer makes unreasonable
demands (or uses statutorily prohibited techniques such as a
polygraph,) 09 the employee must cooperate. A request to assist with an
internal investigation is presumptively reasonable and failure to
cooperate would be proper grounds for termination based on
107 Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1655, 1674 (1996) ("The at-will rule presumptively concedes to the employer the power to fire at
any time for any reason; unless and until the employee can overcome all the hurdles of delay, cost
of litigation, and difficulties of proof in establishing a wrongful discharge, she remains out of a
job and without relief."); see also Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 868 (1995) ("A responsible
private employer may draw sensible inferences from silence and fire the bank clerk who refuses
to respond to accusations of pilfering.").
108 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 2856 (2008); Joseph F. Coyne, Jr. & Charles F. Barker,
Employee Rights and Duties During an Internal Investigation, in INTERNAL CORPORATE
INVESTIGATIONS 169, 171-72 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2002).
109 Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2002 (2006).
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insubordination. Employment contracts may also require cooperation in
any criminal investigations, as well as internal or external
investigations.
Although some states have public policy exceptions to at-will
employment, they do not protect employee silence during internal or
government investigations, but the reverse-they protect employee
speech that assists an investigation by whistle blowers. 10  Civil
whistleblower protections and retaliation claims together with Sarbanes-
Oxley protections further encourage such employee speech; thus a
situation where a corporation would have to tread carefully is that in
which the whistleblower refuses to cooperate with an internal
investigation but has spoken to outside investigators.IlI
Corporations would be highly likely to contract around any regime
in which they would be subject to prosecution for employee
malfeasance and yet would be unable to avoid indictment by
disciplining or terminating culpable employees. Employers can and do
try to avert law enforcement pressure by conducting an internal
investigation quickly, perhaps in conjunction with regulators (who
increasingly emphasize "real-time" investigation), before prosecutors
become involved.
Once law enforcement is involved, as George Cohen writes,
inculpating responsible employees is crucial to any effort by the entity
to secure an agreement to avoid prosecution: "[t]he ability to help the
government nail suspected employee 'bad guys,' which includes the
ability to waive the privilege, is precisely the 'cooperation' that the
corporation has to 'sell' to the government." Once employee conduct is
the subject of a government investigation, the employer has great
incentives to avoid the potentially dire consequences of an indictment
by fully cooperating with prosecutors.
Nothing in this analysis supports any notion that firms should
neglect to discipline culpable employees. Some practitioners
recommend such a step; one states "[i]n short, in the current
environment, we believe that the reasoning behind Judge Kaplan's
decision counsels the internal investigator to refrain from threatening an
employee with termination if he does not cooperate with the
government." 1 2  The Stein decisions provide no reason to fail to
discipline employees that do not cooperate with internal or government
investigations-but they highlight that such decisions should be made
110 Estlund, supra note 107, at 1661 n.26.
III See The Sarbanes-Oxiey Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006); Wayne N. Outten,
When Good Deeds Are Punished: The Legal Landscape of Retaliation and Whistleblowing, 762
PLIILIT 713 (2007).
112 See Bridget Rohde & Peter A. Chavkin, In The Wake Of The KPMG Case, May a
Corporation-On Pain of Termination-Still Demand an Employee's Cooperation with a
Government Investigation?, SN084 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 249 (2008).
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under clear and pre-existing policies, and not at the government's
behest.
Second, as to attorneys fees, corporations may revise their
indemnification agreements to clarify their obligations in response to
decisions like that in Stein, or as part of efforts to discourage
malfeasance."l 3 Executives often secure indemnification provisions in
contracts, often as required by state law, for legal costs and liability in
civil cases and for advancement of legal costs in criminal matters.
Where corporate codes in many states bar indemnification in criminal
matters, unless the executives prevail on the merits, 114 firms often
include contracts that advance costs for legal defense and reserve a final
decision whether to pay them after conviction, by which time
employees may not recover.' 15 The Thompson Memo was clear that
such required payment is not indicative of non-cooperation: "Some
states require corporations to pay the legal fees of officers under
investigation prior to a formal determination of their guilt. Obviously, a
corporation's compliance with governing law should not be considered
a failure to cooperate."'"16 Such contractual terms would not be altered
during negotiations with the DOJ and a breach would result in
successful suits by employees. Firms could benefit by clarifying to all
employees whether under the contract, written or implied, the firm must
advance legal fees in the event of a criminal investigation. Indeed, a
firm could choose to routinely provide separate counsel to employees
during an investigation. Further, as discussed next, retaining separate
counsel may be the best protection for individual employees during a
criminal investigation. However, it may tend to be only higher level
employees with greater bargaining power that obtain contractual
agreements entitling them to separate counsel.
B. Attorney Client Privilege, Not Fifth Amendment Privilege and the
Provision of Warnings
The Miranda rule was adopted because "the coercion inherent in
113 See Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives'
Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 55 (2006).
114 For example, the Delaware Code provides that indemnification for criminal matters is
permitted only if the executive meets certain conditions, including having "no reasonable cause to
believe his conduct was unlawful." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
115 Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate Executives Who Have Been Convicted of
Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REv. 279, 287, 325 (1991). State statutes
governing mandatory indemnification often require that the executive have been successful "on
the merits" and not simply secure dismissal of the charges or a favorable plea bargain, while
statutes typically do not permit indemnification unless the executive "had no reasonable cause to
believe that his conduct was unlawful." See, e.g., tit. 8, § 145(a).
116 Thompson Memo, supra note 15, at n.4.
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custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary
statements" requiring the adoption of "concrete constitutional guidelines
for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."'1 17 The penalty
cases represent an additional means by which the Court crafted
"'extensions' of the bare guarantee," 118 to protect the privilege, in a
manner that does not seek to clarify the standards that govern an
interrogation process, but rather prevents entirely the use of statements
in the situation in which the state directly and severely penalizes the
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. During organizational
confessions, the relevant statements are not typically made in a
custodial setting, and Miranda does not apply. 119 As described, state
coercion is also attenuated during organizational interviews and proffer
sessions with the government. In contrast, employer pressure may be
quite direct and may distort the investigative process. Certain warnings
are sensibly provided, if not to avoid the dangers of physical and
psychological torture and false confessions the Court was concerned
with in Miranda, then to secure reliable information, avoid conflicts of
interest, and to inform employees of their rights.
A series of such internal "warnings" are typically given to
employees during internal investigations by the organization. 120
Employees who are the targets in corporate prosecutions will often be
accompanied at proffer sessions by counsel to the firm and not by their
own counsel. An emerging literature recommends various approaches
towards warning employees, arising in part due to the unsettling of prior
practices caused by the surge in recent prosecutions. Former United
States District Judge Frederick Lacey coined the term "Adnarim"
warnings for such cautionary instructions, that is, Miranda spelled
backwards. 121 The warnings are in no way constitutionally required, but
117 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).
118 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 777 (2003).
119 The custody requirement for triggering the requirement to provide Miranda warnings is
whether the suspect was "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v.
Ariz., 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
120 Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism
and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 859, 944-46 (2003); Marks, supra note
4.
121 Judge Lacey's recommended warnings include:
I am not your lawyer, I represent the corporation. It is the corporation's interests
I have been retained to serve. You are entitled to have your own lawyer. If you cannot
afford a lawyer, the corporation may or may not pay his fee. You may wish to consult
with him before you confer with me. Among other things, you may wish to claim the
privilege against self-incrimination. You may wish not to talk to me at all.
What you tell me, if it relates to the performance of your duties, and is
confidential, will be privileged. The privilege, however, requires explanation. It is not
your privilege to claim. It is the corporation's privilege. Thus, not only can I tell, I
must tell, others in the corporation what you have told me, if it is necessary to enable
me to provide the legal services to the corporation it has retained me to provide.
Moreover, the corporation can waive its privilege and thus, the president, or I, or
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ethical and pragmatic reasons explain why they are often provided. A
particularly robust set of warnings would proceed as follows.
First, corporate counsel should ensure that the employees have full
information regarding any possible conflict so that they may seek
outside counsel. Judge Lacey recommends that counsel for the
corporation inform the employee that they represent the interests of the
corporation and that the employee may wish to consult with separate
counsel. 122 The caveat that the interviewer is counsel for the
organization and not the employee, together with an explanation of any
possible conflict, is required by the Model Rules when it is apparent that
"the organization's interest are adverse to those of the constituents with
whom the lawyer is dealing."' 123 Whether interests have become
adverse may not always be clear; the comment adds that "[w]hether
such a warning should be given . . . may turn on the facts of each
case." 124 Such warnings benefit the firm by avoiding possible conflicts
and later disqualifications of counsel. However, the bare warning that
the attorney represents the firm may also not have a significant effect on
employee behavior.
Second, Upjohn warnings should be provided, stating that all
communications may be disclosed to the government without
employees consent should the corporation waive its attorney-client
privilege. 125 To provide context to such warnings, the interviewer may
want to explain whether a government investigation is pending; whether
the corporation has retained outside counsel concerning the
investigation; and whether the government has expressed an intention to
separately interview employees.126 However, additional explanation
beyond the bare warning may often not be provided. The Upjohn
warnings also may not provide employees with other useful
someone else, can disclose to the authorities what you tell me if the corporation
decides to waive its privilege.
Also, if I find wrongdoing, I am under certain obligations to report it to the Board
of Directors and perhaps the stockholders.
Dennis J. Block & Nancy F. Barton, Implications of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-
Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 108, 17, 40 (quoting
Frederick B. Lacey, former U.S. district judge for the District of New Jersey).
122 Id.
123 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(f) (2007) (requiring corporate lawyers only to
"explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
organization's interests are adverse to those of the" employees).
124 Id. atR. 1.13 cmt 11.
125 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (holding that attorney-client privilege
extends to corporate employees acting within the scope of their duties).
126 See Bennett et al., supra note 51, at 70 ("[A]lthough it may cause the employee to be less
forthcoming, it is prudent to advise the employee affirmatively that the substance of the interview
is likely to be disclosed to company officials or the government."); see also Laurie P. Cohen, In
the Crossfire: Prosecutors' Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against Employees, WALL ST. J.,
June 4, 2004, at Al.
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information, such as whether the firm intends to waive its privilege or
has done so in the past.
Additional warnings could be provided. Employees should also be
told not to share the contents of their statements with others, lest
privilege be waived and the investigation otherwise contaminated. 127
Last, but not least, employees should be told to tell the truth. Whether
further statements are provided might depend on factors including
whether the corporation wishes to provide separate counsel before
interviewing employees; whether immediate discipline of wrongdoers is
intended; whether a prosecution is truly imminent; and what rights to
advance payment of attorneys fees are included in the employment
contract. 128
The delivery of such comments would make a record that the
employee understands the implications of the conversation and would
tend to show that the employee made an informed choice. Warnings
regarding policy on advancement of fees and termination of non-
cooperating employees would avoid potential misunderstandings.
Providing such warnings has costs. All of these warnings,
particularly Upjohn warnings, may discourage employees from
providing statements at all. The effectiveness of such warnings in
protecting employees is also equivocal. Employees may face employer
discipline should they not cooperate. As a result, reciting a litany of
warnings may not affect their behavior. The warnings do not give
employees a more informed sense of the particular risks they face.
Suspects routinely waive Miranda rights during custodial
interrogations; perhaps employees would similarly disregard the various
"Adnarim" warnings provided. 129
The conflict-prevention warnings that counsel for the firm does not
represent the employee and that employees may wish to seek their own
counsel would be most significant if as a result employees might retain
their own counsel. Even given pressure to cooperate, employees with a
contractual right to attorneys' fees may be likely to postpone interviews
in order to consult with counsel. Employees who lacked the bargaining
power to obtain a right to attorneys' fees might be less likely to heed
those warnings and secure counsel.
The ubiquity of some version of these warnings can be explained
not by constitutional criminal procedure but by ethical rules binding
attorneys and also raising practical and reputational concerns for
employers. The basic Upjohn and conflicts warnings avoid uncertainty
127 See Coyne & Barker, supra note 108, at 192.
128 See id. at 191 (noting reasons to approach warnings differently depending on the situation
and noting that "a debate exists about the exact scope of these warnings.")
129 See Richard A. Leo, Criminal Law: Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 266, 286 (1996).
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regarding conflicts. The alternative would be for the firm to not comply
with the ethical rules or provide vague information regarding who
counsel represents and then "watered-down 'Upjohn warnings"'
vaguely adverting to the fact that the firm might waive its privilege. 130
If as a result of unclear representations by corporate counsel, the
employee had a subjective and reasonable belief that counsel represents
the employee and not the firm, then a court may find that an attorney-
client relationship existed and the employee can assert attorney-client
privilege. 131 Having formed such a relationship with the employees,
corporate counsel would have a conflict that might make continued
representation of the corporation not possible. 32  The relevant
statements might then be subject to derivative and use immunity; courts
have cited to Kastigar as providing an analogy for the immunity
conferred in this context. 133 Uncertainty regarding possible conflicts
would potentially harm the firm by raising possible disqualification of
counsel, but would also undermine prosecution of employees and
hamper the firm's cooperation and disclosure to the government.
Thus, sound reasons relating to attorney client privilege and
conflicts of interest support giving such warnings and explain their
ubiquity. However, constitutional criminal procedure and the Fifth
Amendment do not. A court might avoid a difficult inquiry into
voluntariness by relying on the fact that warnings were properly
provided to the employee who therefore might be presumed to have
waived privilege rationally and absent coercive pressure. Even that
benefit would only accrue in the situation where the Fifth Amendment
potentially applies, which as discussed, would be the unusual case
involving close corporate collaboration with the government or
corporate policy change at the behest of the government. In most
situations at the charging stage, the warnings serve to protect no
criminal procedure rights. They instead serve employer interests in
clarity of employee expectations and avoiding unintended formation of
attorney-client relationships.
The question then arises whether the Miranda analogy should be
extended farther so as to render such warnings not just advisable but
130 In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2005). "[Tlhe
putative client must show that his subjective belief that an attorney-client relationship existed was
reasonable under the circumstances." Id. at 339; see also E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F.
Supp. 371, 387 (S.D.Tex. 1969) (discussing reasonableness of employee belief that attorney-
client relationship existed and disqualifying attorneys from representing corporation).
131 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 415 F.3d at 339.
132 See id. at 340.
133 See id.; see also United States v. Schwimmer, 924 F.2d 443, 446 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating in
affmning district court ruling that no privileged information was used by government, that "[t]he
government must demonstrate that the evidence it uses to prosecute an individual was derived
from legitimate, independent sources.") (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62,
(1972)).
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joined with an exclusionary rule, or even more extreme, use-immunity
for statements provided. For the warnings to have any other status,
however, federal courts would have to take two radical and inadvisable
steps: extending the reach of the penalty cases and then elevating such
warnings to Miranda's status as "a constitutional decision."' 34
Congress, in rethinking whether to regulate this area, could enact
legislation requiring that the government proceed with non-custodial
interviews only after providing such warnings. However, even such a
rule would not apply to interviews conducted by employers.
Prosecutors cannot control what information employers provide to
employees during prior interviews, nor what pressure they apply. Not
all targets of criminal investigations desire to secure cooperation. A
firm seeking to conceal criminality might not wish to elicit inculpatory
information, nor inform employees of adverse interests.
Absent rewards for uncovering criminality, some recalcitrant firms
might have incentives not to pursue such interviews at all. A firm that
does not wish to cooperate might then wish to pursue an internal
investigation in a manner designed to produce little information of
value, and indeed, to create conflicts that would hinder future litigation.
The current regime which rewards cooperation therefore may to a
greatly unappreciated extent bolster firm incentives to provide warnings
to employees and ensure that they are informed of their rights. Any
efforts to further encourage firms to provide such warnings and
protections should be directed at firms and not through the route of
criminal procedure protections.
Perhaps the best solution would be for DOJ to include as a factor in
considering whether to grant leniency to a corporation, not just whether
the firm secured the cooperation of employees, but whether the firm did
so in a way that informed them of their rights under their employment
contracts, whatever those may be, avoided potential conflicts of interest,
and informed them of the possibility of entity waiver of privilege. In
that way, federal prosecutors would reward not haphazard cooperation
at all costs, but cooperation that sensibly elicits informed, sound, and
conflict-free statements by employees.
CONCLUSION
Confessions by employees are routine and embedded in the
management of any workplace, but the threat of a prosecution changes
the dynamics surrounding such internal investigations into employee
behavior. A firm's compliance efforts will typically not raise issues
134 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
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under the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment decisions. However, to
safeguard the quality of the information they obtain and prevent
conflicts, firms may increasingly provide warnings to inform employees
before interviewing them. Rewarding such cooperation may help
ensure that such information comes to light and that firms valuing
compliance do not face the harsh consequences of an indictment.
Understanding that criminal procedure will not typically immunize
inculpatory statements that employees deliver during criminal
investigations makes it all the more crucial that firms take on the
responsibility to ensure that internal interventions prevent conflicts,
misunderstandings, litigation, and unreliable evidence. Firms benefit
from clear written policies regarding cooperation during investigations.
Employees, rather than face substantial pressure from firms, should try
to negotiate in advance, contracts with explicit provisions regarding
consequences of non-cooperation. Employees may most benefit from a
clear entitlement to payment of attorneys' fees, where retaining counsel
may best protect their interests during an investigation. Prosecutors,
corporations, regulators and attorneys can encourage the use of detailed
internal warnings during interview sessions to secured reliable and
informed statements. Just as employers have good reasons to avoid
conflicts of interest and unintended formation of attorney-client
relationships, prosecutors have every interest in avoiding such
problems. DOJ Guidelines that reward provision of employer warnings
would add useful incentives to clarify murky interview dynamics.
Finally, despite the focus on employee statements, admissions by a
corporation may be far more powerful. They can summarize all that
was learned during internal and external investigations and in detail
acknowledge commission of a series of crimes. Prosecutors are only
just beginning to put such statements to use, but they may usher in a
new era of confessions by corporations. Self-incrimination by
individuals due to pressure from corporations then comes full circle as
artificial corporate persons themselves confess and inculpate other
individuals and corporations. The Fifth Amendment has little to say
about either problem, but these complex confession dynamics will help
to define employment relationships at a time when prosecutors
increasingly pursue charges against both employees and corporations.
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